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Suddenly everything is happening at 
once: Permanent Structured Cooperation 
(PESCO), the Coordinated Annual 
Review on Defence (CARD), the 
European Defence Fund (EDF)… The 
launch of PESCO is expected before the 
end of the year or in early 2018 at the 
latest. Now that things seem to be 
moving fast, let us make sure that they 
move in the right direction. 
 
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 
projects could be. At their bilateral meeting on 
13 July 2017, they announced joint initiatives, 
among others, to develop major land combat, 
artillery, and maritime patrol systems, and a 
combat aircraft, while confirming their 
support for the Eurodrone programme with 
Spain and Italy, and launching structured 
cooperation between their cyber commands.  
 
Other EU Member States should be able to 
join all of these. Indeed, they will have to. For 
if Paris and Berlin effectively do what they 
seem to be announcing, i.e. creating a Franco-
German military industrial complex (I know I 
am not mincing my words), then the other 
Member States will have to plug in or their 
own defence industry will not survive. Even 
British defence industry may find it imperative 
to join in. At the same time, France and 
Germany effectively need others to join, for in 
many areas even together they cannot reach 
the critical mass of investors and customers 
needed to make a project economically viable.  
 
France and Germany therefore need to 
establish a core group that agrees on the way 
ahead. Which is why together with Italy and 
Spain they submitted a first detailed proposal 
for the activation of PESCO (which has 
already been underwritten by Belgium). What 
could be done through PESCO, how could it 
be done and, most importantly, why should we 
do it?  
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Leading the way are the European 
Commission on the one hand and France and 
Germany on the other. They are focusing on 
the heart of the matter: the urgent need for 
Europeans to start designing, building and 
procuring all future major equipment together, 
instead of competing each other into the 
ground.  
 
The Commission seeks to provide incentives. 
In the next budgetary cycle, post-2020, the 
capability window of the EDF, the European 
Defence Industrial Development Programme 
(EDIDP), should amount to €5 billion per 
year, from which up to 20% can be funded 
from the EU budget, for multinational projects 
that address a commonly identified shortfall. 
For projects in the framework of PESCO, an 
additional bonus of 10% is foreseen. France 
and Germany are proposing what those 
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WHAT?  
The current debate is strongly focused on 
projects. Understandably so, for projects 
render PESCO tangible. Around a dozen 
Member States that have expressed an interest 
in joining PESCO have tentatively identified 
nearly 40 projects that could be undertaken in 
that framework. Many of these however are 
unrelated to any EU objective. Member States 
not unexpectedly looked for projects that they 
were going to do anyway that could credibly 
be re-labelled as a contribution to PESCO.  
 
It is urgent therefore to prioritize, collectively. 
The proposal mentions “strategic defence 
capabilities projects”. The number one priority 
should without any doubt be strategic 
enablers: their absence affects all Member 
States’ capacity to deploy, and it cannot be 
remedied by any Member State alone. Without 
this top-down but collective political steering, 
the interests of industry and of individual 
States will prevail, and the added value of 
PESCO will remain very limited.  
 
Capability projects is only the first layer of 
what could be done through PESCO. The 
second layer is to create more integrated 
forces, so that additional capabilities will be 
operated in the most cost-effective way 
possible. Once a project has delivered, would 
it not make more sense to operate the 
resulting capability as a single force, co-owned 
by all participating States, rather than to divide 
it up again? Thus a drone fleet, or a transport 
fleet could emerge, for example. Individual 
drones or aircraft can still be owned by 
individual Member States, but they could rely 
on a single structure for command, logistics, 
maintenance and training, and they can all 
follow the same rhythm of upgrades. Such 
integration should be wired into PESCO from 
the start.  
 
Combat units can be operated more cost-
effectively as well, by anchoring them into 
multinational frameworks. Even a smaller 
State can maintain a significant combat 
capacity, if its battalions or its fighter aircraft 
can be anchored in a multinational formation. 
Rather than having to field all support units 
itself, combat support and combat service 
support will be provided through a 
combination of pooling and division of labour 
between the participating States. Just like 
Belgian-Dutch naval cooperation: a ship sails 
under the Belgian flag with a Belgian crew or 
under the Dutch flag with a Dutch crew, but 
there is only one naval command and one 
naval operations school, only the Dutch 
provide logistics, maintenance and training for 
all frigates, and only the Belgians for all mine-
hunters.  
 
Apart from a reference to making better use of 
existing multinational structures such as 
Eurocorps, this dimension is not now 
discussed very much in the context of PESCO. 
But it is exactly what Germany and its partners 
are doing in the context of the Framework 
Nations Concept (FNC), under the aegis of 
NATO. Both schemes can fit together, 
however. If, hypothetically, 15 Member States 
would join PESCO, that does not mean that all 
15 have to do everything together. In some 
areas, especially strategic enablers, there could 
indeed be only one cluster of all or nearly all 
15. But in other areas, there can be more than 
one cluster within the PESCO group. Thus, 
when it comes to land forces, the German-led 
FNC group with the Dutch, the Czechs and 
others could constitute one building-block of 
PESCO, one multinational corps structure, and 
a French-led group with for example the 
Belgians and the Spanish another.  
 
Even if all Member States were to spend more, 
if they all do so separately, they will not be able 
to address the strategic capability shortfalls. If 
they do so collectively, PESCO will act as a 
multiplier.  
 
HOW?  
Launching projects requires participating States 
to invest. Integrating forces requires them to 
bring capabilities to the table. Hence the need 
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for binding commitments, to ensure that 
everybody contributes a fair share, and 
continues to do so over time. The same debate 
is of course taking place in NATO, where 
Allies have pledged “to aim to move towards 
the 2% guideline” by 2024. In the debate on 
PESCO, a commitment to increase defence 
budgets in real terms is on the table, in order 
to reach “agreed objectives”. What those 
objectives are, is not spelled out however, 
because many States will simply not now spend 
as much as 2% of GDP on defence. At the 
same time it would hardly make sense for 
States to say, in the context of PESCO, that 
1.5% is enough when they have already signed 
up to 2% in NATO.  
 
Much more important, because more realistic, 
and mentioned explicitly, is the commitment 
for 20% of total defence spending to be 
invested. First of all, investment is key to kick-
starting PESCO. Second, this forces States 
who now spend two thirds or more on salaries 
to increase defence spending anyway, but 
without spelling it out. And in the EDIDP, 
which is a form of common funding, they now 
have an important incentive to fulfil this 
obligation. Some pundits belittle the EDIDP, 
stating that €5 billion per year is not much 
compared to the more than €200 billion that 
the EU-28 spend on defence. But compared to 
the €45 billion or so of this total that is spent 
on investment (€35 billion without the UK), it 
is a sizeable amount of money. If it is put to 
use to launch a limited number of key projects, 
it can really orient the decisions of the 
participating States. Furthermore, under 
PESCO States would commit to multinational 
projects as the default option and launch 
national projects only when no other option is 
available.  
 
We generate capabilities so that we can use 
them when necessary. Therefore, participating 
Member States would also commit to provide 
“substantial support with means and 
capabilities” to every CSDP operation. The 
Council launches operations by unanimity, of 
course, but no Member State that is in PESCO 
should vote for an operation and then decline 
to take part in it. Or, if it does not possess any 
relevant capability (a land-locked country 
without a navy can hardly take part in 
Operation Sophia or Atalanta), to co-fund it. 
The fact remains however that in recent years 
the most substantial operations, in terms of 
numbers deployed and risk incurred, have been 
conducted outside the EU or NATO 
framework, by individual States or ad hoc 
coalitions.  
 
Once enacted by the Council, these 
commitments will be not just politically but 
legally binding as well, unlike NATO’s Wales 
pledge. More like the Maastricht criteria, in 
effect. That does create another dynamic. To 
this day not all members of the Eurozone fulfil 
all criteria, but they fulfil most. A proposal for 
a governance mechanism is on the table, 
including sanctions for non-compliance, that 
will see to it that PESCO becomes equally 
successful. For those joining PESCO, CARD 
can be an important assessment tool, but then 
it should be made compulsory (and not just 
supported “to a maximum extent 
acknowledging [its] voluntary nature”, as is 
now the proposal). If not linked to the 
concrete commitments made in PESCO, 
CARD will probably have but little impact.  
 
These criteria make for an “inclusive and 
ambitious” PESCO, as the proposal states, 
because they are realistic. They are within reach 
of every Member State that wants to, which 
will then ipso facto have the right to join.  
 
WHY?  
Thanks to the legally binding nature of PESCO 
and the financial contribution by the 
Commission, a new defence initiative has more 
chance of success through the EU. But why is 
an integrated European initiative necessary in 
the first place? Because Europeans need to 
achieve strategic autonomy, as the EU Global 
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Strategy (EUGS) points out. That means the 
capacity to undertake certain vital military tasks 
at all times, if necessary therefore by ourselves, 
without recourse to any non-European assets. 
Therefore the plan is for PESCO to create a 
“coherent full spectrum force package”.  
 
What are these tasks exactly that we should be 
able to carry out autonomously? On 14 
November 2016, the Council adopted the 
Implementation Plan on Security and Defence, 
intended to operationalize the EUGS. This 
plan lists an ambitious range of operations that 
the EU should be able to undertake, from 
“joint crisis management operations in 
situations of high security risk in the regions 
surrounding the EU” and “joint stabilisation 
operations, including air and special 
operations”, through air security and maritime 
security operations, to capacity-building. The 
fact that among EU officials this list is 
commonly known as “the annex of the annex” 
indicates that its impact on what is actually 
happening is limited.  
 
The reason is that the Implementation Plan 
does not specify how many operations the EU 
has to be able to conduct simultaneously, only 
that “a number of [these] may be executed 
concurrently”. Nor does it give any indication 
of the envisaged scale of these operations. In 
fact, the Implementation Plan limits the scale 
by stating that the EU should be capable of 
these operations based on “previously agreed 
goals and commitments”, i.e. the existing 
Headline Goal. In reality, strategic autonomy 
cannot be achieved within that framework, but 
Member States were not willing, at 28, to open 
the Headline Goal for debate. An update of 
the five Illustrative Scenarios that drive the 
identification of military requirements, by the 
EU Military Staff, will feed into an update of 
the Capability Development Plan, by the 
European Defence Agency, by the end of 
2018. But since they cannot go beyond the 
current Headline Goal, the actual military level 
of ambition concomitant with the EUGS 
remains undefined (to the quiet exasperation of 
many involved in this task). This makes it 
difficult to prioritise and quantify capability 
initiatives through PESCO.  
 
What proved impossible at 28, can still happen 
within the group of Member States that join 
PESCO, however. In fact, an ambitious 
proposal is already on the table. One of the 
flagship projects envisaged by France, 
Germany, Italy and Spain is the creation of an 
“EUFOR Crisis Response Operation Core” or 
EUFOR CROC.1 A hideous acronym, but an 
excellent idea: to produce not a “readiness 
force”, but a concrete list of force elements, 
which would accelerate the force sensing 
process after the Council has decided to launch 
an operation. This would be an important 
improvement on the existing generic Force 
Catalogue. The scale of this land-centric CROC 
is none other than that of the Headline Goal: 
60,000 troops, or a corps headquarters, three 
divisions and 9 to 12 brigades. As this is to be 
achieved by the PESCO group alone, and of 
course without the UK, it represents a 
significant increase in the level of ambition for 
the participating Member States.  
 
The initiators explicitly state that they “do not 
strive for a European army, but envision 
deployable and interoperable force 
components ready to be employed under one 
command and as one multinational coherent 
full spectrum force package for the most 
demanding EU crisis response operations”. Yet 
creating this package will definitely imply a far-
reaching degree of integration of forces, along 
the lines described above. If seen through to 
the end, ever more multinational procurement, 
multinational capability development, and 
multinational formations will logically and 
automatically lead to the next step in European 
defence: ex ante multinational defence 
planning. Just like over the years the Belgian 
and Dutch navies have grown so close that, 
though it was never the stated intent, they now 
have to plan together (and continue to provide 
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the required budget, of course) in order to 
maintain the same degree of integration.  
 
If air and naval forces are added at the same 
scale, and all the enablers required to project 
them, this is the military level of ambition that 
Europeans need if they really want to live up to 
the political level of ambition expressed in the 
EUGS. That requires thinking on a truly 
European scale. We should not allow our 
thinking to be limited to the highest level of 
ambition of any individual Member State, as a 
military officer rightly told me. Perhaps no 
individual European country sees the need for 
a carrier group or a fleet of armed drones, but 
that doesn’t mean that it cannot be a 
requirement for Europe as a whole.  
 
MORE QUESTIONS  
Questions remain, notably about how 
Germany sees the exact link between PESCO, 
pushed mostly by the foreign ministry, and the 
FNC, which comes first on the agenda of the 
defence establishment. As a German official 
put it to me, so far both initiatives have been 
“de-conflicted, but not yet coordinated”. In 
some views, the Bundeswehr should prioritize 
the FNC, understood to aim at high-intensity 
operations in the context only of collective 
defence; force generation for expeditionary 
operations would remain a challenge.2 But even 
if the majority of the force package that the 
German-led FNC group is building would 
indeed focus on territorial defence, some 
existing modules clearly are of an expeditionary 
nature, notably the anchoring of the Dutch air-
mobile brigade in the German air-mobile 
division. This and other modules that can serve 
both territorial defence and expeditionary 
operations could be pre-identified as part of 
the CROC.  
 
This relates to the broader question of where 
PESCO fits in the EU-NATO relationship. 
Assuring the strategic autonomy of European 
allies and partners as a group is not an 
objective of the NATO Defence Planning 
Process (NDPP) – so it doesn’t. What PESCO 
does is to formulate the level of ambition for 
the strategic autonomy of a group of European 
states. That strategic autonomy does not (yet) 
include territorial defence, but only the 
protection of Europe against threats falling 
short of the Article 5 threshold, and 
expeditionary operations across the spectrum. 
This collective level of ambition must be 
incorporated into the NDPP, in between the 
level of ambition for NATO as a whole and 
the targets for every individual ally, in order to 
ensure that the future capability mix does take 
into account the need for European strategic 
autonomy. As the proposal explicitly mentions, 
PESCO will thus “strengthen the European 
pillar within the Alliance”.  
 
Just like in NATO, the proposal is that the 
participating States in PESCO should submit a 
“national implementation plan” outlining how 
they plan to reach the targets to which they 
have committed. Two phases, 2018-2021 and 
2021-2025, are envisaged, so that commitments 
can be sequenced. Those that are both NATO 
allies and members of PESCO could draw up a 
single plan. It is at the national level that 
NATO and PESCO targets must be 
coordinated in the first place.  
 
Very importantly, at the 13 July Franco-
German meeting it was also announced that in 
2018 French troops will deploy to Lithuania, in 
the context of the German-led prepositioned 
NATO-forces. At the same time, Germany and 
France will support the G5 Sahel countries3 
with training and equipment. These might just 
be “courtesy deployments”, as a NATO official 
worded it to me. But it could also be seen as a 
symbolic expression of the crafting of a new 
strategic consensus between the two States 
who, if they now act upon their ambitious 
proposals, will constitute the core of European 
defence.  
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CONCLUSION  
Will they do it? That is the ultimate question, of 
course. Having been writing about European 
defence for nearly twenty years now, I have 
written more than one article in which I 
proclaimed that the moment for a breakthrough 
had arrived – only to see it come and go. And 
yet I remain (cautiously) optimistic, because 
optimism is in my nature, for one, but also 
because today there are objective reasons for my 
optimism. With France and Germany and the 
Commission championing European defence, 
putting concrete and ambitious proposals on the 
table and offering incentives, leadership is 
stronger than at any time in the past two 
decades. Perhaps, just perhaps, I will next write 
a paper explaining the success of PESCO.  
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